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Abstract:
Purpose: Collusion is a common behavior of  oligarch enterprises aiming to get an advantage
in market competition. The purpose of  the research is to explore positive or negative effects
from the electricity generation manufacturers’ collusion through statistical analysis approach. To
be exact, these effects are discovered both in market economy at a macro-economic level and in
enterprise behaviors at a micro-economic level.
Design/methodology/approach: This research designs a model as an extension of  Porter’s
model (Green & Porter, 1984). In this model FIML is applied. Taking price bidding project
launched in China’s power industry as an example, this paper conducts an empirical research on
its relevant price data collected from subordinate power plants of  China’s five power generation
groups in the pilots.
Findings: It is found in this paper that power generation enterprises are facing collusion issues
in the market. To be exact, it is such a situation in which non-cooperative competition and
collusion alternate. Under the competition, market is relatively steady, thus forming a lower
network price. It is helpful to the development of  the whole industry. However, once Cartel is
formed, the price will rise and clash with power enterprises and transmission-distribution
companies concerning the interests conflicts. At the same time, a higher power price will form
in the market, making consumers suffer losses. All of  these are bad for industry development.
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Not only the collusion of  power enterprises affects power price but also the market power that
caused by long-time Cartel will reduce the market entrant in electricity generation. Market
resources are centralized in the hands of  Cartel, causing a low effective competition in the
market, which has passive effects on users.
Implications: The empirical research also indicates that collusion undoubtedly benefits the
power enterprises that involved. As a cooperation pattern, collusion can lead to the synergy
between relevant companies. However, collusion harms the benefits of  other market entities.
During the process of  enterprises creating common interests cooperatively, collusion may bring
harm to the outside industry.
Originality/value: Using empirical research method, the paper takes China’s power industry as
an example to show the gains and losses of  collusion from two aspects, namely market
economy and strategic management.
Keywords: power generation market, market power, regional market, collusion, cartel
1. Introduction
Collusion often occurs among oligarch enterprises. They seek higher profits by entering into
agreement and alliance in the price, production, and sales of commodity. But this behavior will
have adverse effects on other market participants, even the whole market. Porter (1982) put
forward the concept of collusion and defines the non-competitive strategic behaviors
accordingly. To indicate how the non-competitive strategic behaviors bring benefits to
enterprises and how enterprises adjust their micro management methods for collusion
combined with problems in terms of collusion among enterprises, the research will take power
industry and power generation market as an example to give a conclusion through quantitative
analysis.
In 2005 and 2006, the Northeast area of China was the first pilot carrying out generation-side
bidding in regional power market. The bi-lateral power price market has been a pilot from
January 1st, 2005 in Northeastern region. As a market entrant, Northeast China Grid company
takes part in this pilot project with 17 power generation plants which are subordinate
companies of five power generation Groups. The Grid Company dispatching department is in
the charge of making market operation regulation, building operation system, organizing
bidding transaction and settling accounts. According to the data feedback of dispatching center,
in the first four months, the total electricity quantity after two-wheeled bidding is 86.278
billion kilowatt-hours. While the average price is 191.029 Yuan RMB per kilowatt-hour, which is
higher than standard price. The equalization fund surplus is 118 million Yuan RMB and does
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not achieve the goal of 300 million Yuan RMB required by the project. After repairing
technology platform, another 6 power generation plants, all of which belong to China Guodian
Corporation, joined aiming at completing the prescribed 87.9%, but failed. In 2006, with the
continuing implementation of price bidding policy, another 4 plants, all of which belong to
China Huaneng Group Corporation, joined into the pilots. According to the feedback from
dispatching center, the annual average power price of these price bidding units is 246.193
Yuan RMB per thousand kilowatt-hour, which goes over 41.47 Yuan RMB than standard price
207.723 Yuan RMB. The annual quantity of electricity is 82,854 million kilowatt-hour and the
equalization fund deficit is 3,436 million Yuan RMB. Since the losses are more serious than that
of 2005, the bidding transaction of Northeastern power market is suspended.
The failure of pilots puzzles the relevant departments. According the report provided by
dispatching center, several reasons are summarized: 1) increase of power price causes great
losses; 2) the market is not managed well and the corresponding policies are not sound; 3)
there is a lot of room for market quoted price, and the risk prediction and information
management are not well.
To combine theory with practice, this paper learns the successful reform experience from
international power industry and, taking the price biding project of generation side in
Northeast power market in 2005 as research sample, explores the root cause of the failure of
price biding policy from the generation-side power market. Unlike the JEC case, power
generation groups prefer secretly make contract when colluding. According to Nash equilibrium
punishment model designed by Porter, this research uses time series model in price and gross
output to conform to the basic structure of Porter model. On the basis of the established
model, five power generation groups will be studied so as to deeply inspect collusion of
electricity generation manufacturers in the market, and corresponding data sources will also be
selected from the five groups and their relevant provincial affiliates. 
The model proposed by Green and Porter (1984) has observed that the changes of
manufacturers’ behaviors are dynamic, including competition and cooperation. Following the
research method of Green and Porter (1984), the original hypothesis is designed as During the
work period of big consumers purchasing electrical pilot directly, external demand and cost
change can lead to fluctuation in power price and electricity output, which has nothing to do
with collusion among the five power generation companies. This research will test this
hypothesis empirically and reveals the collusion among enterprises in electricity generation
part, which is demonstrated to be the main obstruction of implementing the price biding policy.
And finally, we put forward some conclusions and suggestions to help establish a benign
environment for competition.
In this research, we put a sort of literature review to point out relevant theories in chapter 2.
Then, the model will be established in chapter 3, which actually suggests new theories. The
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relationship between Chapter 4 and chapter 5 are close, which is analysis based on collected
data. Chapter 6 is summary which points out the idea.
2. Literature Review
When analyzing enterprises’ behaviors in imperfect market competition, scholars usually
embark from enterprise commodity price to conduct the analysis. According to the feature that
price can reflect various market information, macro entity including government and micro
entities including enterprises will prudently consider the price and management methods on
benefit promotion. Oligarch market is a typical imperfect market. The number of the
enterprises that participate in the market activities is limited. Similarly, there is also a
differentiation market power. Both of them will lead to the noncompetitive strategic behaviors
of individual enterprises. While affecting the market average price, oligarch enterprises can
promote their own benefits. The structure of electricity generation market can approximately
be seen as an imperfect competition market monopolized by oligarchs. Therefore, many
scholars adopt Bertrand model and Gounod model in research. These typical models can help
scholars structure and analyze the pattern of the generation-side market so as to form a
macro and micro acknowledgment of the manufacturers’ behaviors in the market. 
Research by Ventosa, Baíllo, Ramos and Rivier (2005) used Bertrand’s price competition model
to prove that monopolistic competitive market can establish a transaction system of Power
Pool and form Nash equilibrium. Thus the competition among manufacturers can reach the
level of a perfect competition, which forms the market trend. Actually, the power enterprises
do quote price every day. The infinitely repeated game will probably lead to strategic
cooperation among enterprises. Research by Khalfallah (2013) discussed about Britain power
industry and pointed out that he has found such cooperation behaviors while doing the
transaction practice. The secret contracting purchase for electricity caused by the cooperation
leads the noncompetitive monopoly situation in Britain power supply section (Bensaid & Lesne,
1996). At last, due to the different ways of power generation and units’ consumption, the
marginal cost of power enterprises is also different. Research by Harrington, Hüschelrath,
Laitenberger and Smuda (2014) proved that power commodity exists differences in space and
quality. This also can lead to strategic cooperation among enterprises. Many scholars might be
affected by the rigorous conditions of Bertrand assumption when applying the theory to
research on oligopolistic market and their conclusions might have some faults. However, these
researches revealed necessary conditions of collusion behaviors well.
Bertrand model makes enterprises the price-setters. But many scholars think the market
competition of power enterprises depends on output and productivity decisions instead of price
decision. Therefore they choose Gounod model to be their research basis. It also opens up a
new research orientation: analyzing the output without limitation of the price. Research by
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Fonseca and Normann (2014) used Gounod model to imitate generation-side electricity market
monopolized by oligarchs, under the condition of complete information and incomplete
information. Their research also imitated Nash equilibrium solution caused by manufacturers’
game. By calculation examples they analyzed the effect the market information has on the
state of Nash equilibrium. Finally, Gounod model is proved to be more adaptive to explain the
real competitive situation in electricity generation market than Bertrand model. However, some
existing research based on Gounod model obviously had some deficiencies. For example, their
research was limited to the equilibrium solution after the game process. In other words, they
discussed manufacturers’ game process under the conditions of information symmetry and
asymmetry rather than giving a lucubration to their strategic behavior. According to the
relevant economics principles about imperfect competition and the above mentioned literature,
it can be inferred that some power generation manufacturers can maximize their profits by
game. At that time, there will be imperfect competition equilibrium in the market. The power
price will be higher than that of perfect competition market. But now, different manufacturers
have different market power. Mighty market power can make market entry barriers and
information asymmetry in competition. While the asymmetric information will lead to
manufacturers’ noncompetitive strategic behaviors. All these micro market behaviors will bring
difficulties to market supervision and affect the normal operation of the market. 
The quantitative research on enterprises’ micro behaviors belongs to the theoretical category
of the NEIO (New Empirical Industrial Organization). SCP analysis framework is the basic
pattern of early empirical industrial organization analysis. Researches by Bain (1941; 1949;
1951; 1993) had explained the analytic method and theoretical basis in detail. Like Bain’s
analytic pattern, the research by Weiss (1974) emphasized statistical relation between
industrial profits and industrial concentration. But it does not build any model on individual
enterprise, let alone a quantitative conclusion to the strategic behaviors of enterprises. In the
early research of industrial organization, the price synergy among enterprises is an
unreachable field. It can neither give an empirical measurement and judgment to collusion, nor
provide effective guide and forewarning for enterprises.
Research by Porter (1983) had laid a foundation for the exploration of this field. The core
contents of this research is to supervise the cost characteristics and demand shift to measure
competition behaviors among enterprises and provides reasonable probability. After that,
Bresnahan (1987) applied and expanded Porter’s way of supervising collusion to different
commodities through building a system. In the system commodity features can be observed.
And the model design is simpler, which also provides a platform for this research to study
generation-side power market. The exploration method proposed by Porter and Zona (1993;
1999) distinguished collusion by measuring the differences of determinants of price. All the
methods above can be significant theoretical basis for researching collusion of generation-side
power market in power industry and valid evidences for management. These methods can also
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pave the way for forewarning the collusion among manufacturers of generation-side electricity
market in power industry.
3. Basic Model
Researches by Roy, Hanssens and Raju (1994) and by Sudhir (2011) believed that the
fluctuation observed cannot totally attribute to collusion between manufacturers because
changes in price and output are affected by many factors. In addition, during the process of
dynamic game, it is rather difficult for manufacturers to identify collusion and competition
through relevant data about price and output. Research by Green and Porter (1984) pointed
out that enterprises taking part in Cartel in the market have to catch market information at
any time so that they can find other participants’ behaviors, some of which need support and
others need to be restrained. In this case, if the five power generation companies price their
own net bidding without knowing other companies’ power output, then all power generation
companies can be regarded as homogeneity, that is to say, they are in the same price market.
If market demand curve includes random factor, then the appearance of ultra-low cost in
market is a sign of demand promotion or collusion deviation.
There is always a reservation price in Cartel alliance (Green & Porter, 1984). Supposing that
the price in market is below the bottom line, participants will make immediate reaction to
maintain Cartel. Otherwise, it will break. The appearance of low-cost is certainly caused by the
betrayal of some enterprise. Enterprises, considering secretly expanding their output level over
collusion level, must weigh the profits gained in a short period, the risk increase when market
price is lower than trigger price and the possible low-profit risk. Green and Porter (1984) also
point out that price war occurring in the market should happen after the unanticipated
recession in demand rather than after the real cheat of participating enterprises. Therefore, it
is necessary to define game behaviors in non-cooperation market. As the cooperation period
getting longer, output descends to full cooperation level and marginal revenue of cheat
increases, which will result in the increasing betrayers. Hence, Cartel has to be maintained
through raising trigger price. In this research, two rhetoric questions are proposed: 1) whether
price bidding of generation side can lead electricity generation manufacturers to raise the
price; 2) whether price fluctuation is related to non-cooperative competition behaviors.
Employing simultaneous equations of switching regressions model proposed by Porter (1983)
to estimate parameters of demands and cost function. Concrete model is set as follows,
(1)
In this model, aggregate demand is marked as logarithmic linear function of price. pt is market
price at time t. Lt is dummy variable. U1t is independent normally distributed variable, N(0, 12).
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1 is price elasticity and we assumed it to be negative. 2 is also negative and displays the
recession in electricity demand.
Due to the different and asymmetric of corporate cost function in generation-side market, the
cost function is set to be,
(2)
In this function, d is the flexibility variable cost to output. Porter’s model (1983) had set it as a
fixed value and if equilibrium exists, then the value will greater than 1. ai are specific variable
parameters and reveal different features among enterprises. Fi are fixed costs and are small
enough to guarantee anticipated discount profits to be positive.
Due to the homogeneity of products in all power generation enterprises, the same price in
market equilibrium and different behaviors of enterprises, their actions can be set as,
(3)
In (3), MC refers to marginal cost. Formula (3) can offer another perspective on the strength
of enterprise market forces, providing the foundation for the empirical results at the rest of
this paper. Based on the change of MC, three cases can be set as follows. Case 1: Enterprises
choose non-cooperative price at any time bucket. Then as expected by the theory of Bertrand,
its price is equal to marginal cost, that is qit = 0. Case 2: Enterprises implement interest-
coalition and maximize the common interests, that is qit =1. Case 3: Enterprises produce at the
level of Gounod (5 enterprises), that is, qit equals to market share and also equals to
Sit = qit/Qit. According to date type collected by Porter (1983), using aggregated data
calculation and weighting individual supply equation by using market share during t time
bucket, supply relationship should be,
(4)
In (4), , simultaneous market and cost function can be inferred,
(5)
Porter’s model (1983) inferred that market share of each enterprise will not change along with
time and industrial behaviors, whereas the bigger the change of the ai variable cost
parameters is, the smaller the market share of enterprises will be. Supply relationship can be
further deduced as:
(6)
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In (6), , it can be concluded that D is influenced only by parameters of cost
function. The value of q is corresponded to Bertrand, Gounod and full cooperation. Suppose I is
an indicator variable. When it is in cooperation, it should be 1; and when it is in disintegration
(non-cooperation), it should be 0. Therefore, the supply relationship can be deduced as
follows,
(7)
in which, b0 = logD, b1 = d – 1, suppose d is greater than 0, then b1 should be positive. The
research by Porter (1983) pointed out that the best implementation mechanism will exchange
short-term interest for the stability of Cartel in the future. Therefore, in this case, the value of
b3 will be estimated solely rather than be restricted. Because the price in cooperation period
will be relatively high, the value of b3 should be positive. Suppose it conforms to Bernoulli
distribution:
(8)
According to this, switching and regression problems about simultaneous equation are
produced. Switching is only reflected in the constant term of supply equation and b0 has the
same implication with b3. Parameters of demand and supply function as well as handover
probability  can be estimated using the method proposed by Kiefer (1980). The technology is
called E-M clustering (Expectation-Maximization Clustering). Porter (1983) points out that
when applying E-M clustering to this kind of model, function (2) and (3) can be merged into
(9)
In (9),
(10)
(11)
Ut  N(0,) meets independent identically distributed,  in the given situation,
the probability density function of yt is
(12)
-950-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1515
If there are T observed value, maximal likelihood function should exist:
(13)
If sequence {It} is known, the estimate value of B, ,  and  can be obtained through
maximal likelihood function. When the sequence meets Bernoulli distribution, the probability
density function of yt can be written as:
(14)
Likelihood function can be written as:
(15)
Given an initial estimate {10, …, T0}, then 10 refers to the estimate of Pr{It = 1}. Get the
initial estimate of  through 0 = tt0/T, and the initial estimate of B, , ,  can be obtained
by maximizing L(10, …, T0). Using 0 = (0, 0, B0, I0) to signify above estimates. Research by
Kiefer (1980) employed Bayes algorithm to update sequence t0:
(16)
If new sequence {10, …, T0} exists, the new estimate 1 of (B, , , )can also be obtained
by maximizing L(10, …, T0). The new estimate of  is 1 = tt1/T, and iterative program can
continue until the result converged, i.e., the two consecutive correlation of iteration exceeds
0.999. At this moment, the estimate values of  and  are maximal likelihood estimates.
Therefore,  is maximized.
Research by Lee and Porter (1984) pointed out that if the maximal likelihood estimate of t
exceeds 0.5, it can be proved that t is in collusion period. At this moment, new sequence
 produces. If  equals to 1, then  will be greater than 0.5; if  equals to 0,
then  will be in other cases. Keifer (1980) did not make any definition to estimation process.
If conforming to the price strategy triggered by bottom price proposed by Green and Porter
(1984), then the new sequence will follow Markov derivation process. Such restrictions will
bring difficulties to estimation process. We employ the estimation method proposed by Keifer
to define PN and maximum likelihood method focus coefficient. The maximum likelihood
estimate of Keifer is in accordance with the estimated result of Logistic model. In order to
understand the specified function form, evaluate the sensibility of the plan and estimate the
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model using the linearity setting  in Equation (9), Porter(1983) points out that it
will not have significant difference in terms of empirical results.
4. Variable Design and Data Collection
The data collection ranged from January 1st, 2005 to January 1st, 2007 and included daily
settlement data because price bidding pilot period is from 2005 to 2006. The data came from
five power generation groups in Jilin province, Liaoning province, the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang province. Five power generation groups are China
Huadian Corporation, China Huaneng Group, China Guodian Corporation, China Datang
Corporation, China Power Investment Corporation. The data set includes everyday power
generation data of subordinate power generation companies and relevant settlement statistics
of dispatching center. The data are obtained through system integration of State Electricity
Regulatory Commission and dispatching center of State Grid Corporation of China. 
According to the actual situation in this case, there are 17 power stations taking parting in pilot
from January 1st 2005 to March 1st, 2006, 6 new power stations from May 1st 2005 to
December 31st, 2005, and 4 new power stations from January 1st, 2006 to December 31st,
2006. The collected data mainly include daily generating volume of thermal power of five
power generation groups, total power generating volume, unit price of thermal power and
some necessary information. And then we design variables as in Table 1.
MR Daily settlement price index of thermal power of five power generation groups.
TSU Actual daily generating volume of thermal power of five power generation groups.
LGR Dummy variable: LGR=1, if State Grid adjusted transmission-distribution price; LGR=0, otherwise.
PO Dummy variable: PO=1, if price fluctuation among groups is observed; PO=0, if not.
PN Dummy variable: PN=1, if price fluctuation among groups is estimated by Keifer model; PN=0, if not.
DM1 Dummy variable: DM1=1, if there is new power plant of China Guodian Corporation join the pilot from2005.5.1 to 2005.12.31; DM1=0, if not.
DM2 Dummy variable: DM1=1, if there is new power plant of China Huaneng Group join the pilot from 2006.1.1to 2006.12.31; DM2=0, if not.
Note: Samples data-collection period: from 2005.1.1 to 2007.1.1. Collection scope: five power generation groups in Jilin, Liaoning, the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang.
Table 1. Variable setting
MR: Samples-collection contains only thermal power units and there is no subsidy for thermal
power price. Therefore, subsidy policy is not involved and price index can be more accurate
and coincide better with logarithmic model. 
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(17)
TSU: Actual daily generating volume of thermal power of five power generation groups. The
situation that not all units are full generated is ignored. The thermal power units in the five
groups are nearly the same and raw materials only differ in coal types, such as Shenhua Coal,
Zhunge’er Coal. In this research, the products are assumed homogeneous. Based on this
hypothesis, we will leave out the characteristic function of multilevel demand structure
proposed by Houseman.
LGR: During the data-collection process, through the comparison between transmission-
distribution price and the real generating capacity of the five groups and their subordinate
power generation enterprises, we find that during the pilot process, transmission-distribution
price of grid companies keeps changing. It is obviously the fluctuation of transmission-
distribution price will affect the final electricity price. Therefore, dummy variable LGR is
necessary for this model.
PO: The change of the electric power dispatching can be estimated through the dispatching
and monitoring system of State Grid. Based on it, it is feasible to work out the real-time price
fluctuation and to judge whether there is price war among the five groups.
PN: This dummy variable is based on Keifer’s method (1980). According to the definition of ,
PN reveals whether the five groups are in collusion. In addition, it will also reflect degree of
collusion (MacAvoy, 1965; Ulen, 1978).
DM1 and DM2: Newly increased pilot power plants may shock the existing markets and may
cause subtle changes in market structure. Their influence on the implement of the policy is
worthy of concern and research. These two dummy variables can be combined with Formula
(3) to analyze the influence the intensity of market power has on the collusion degree.
Verification on the effect of price biding policy on collusion behaviors is another major issues of
this research. Although there is no variables represent policy index, the result from detecting
collusion during the sample period still has an explanation meaning to this question. In order
to make the measurement results more accurate, we established data screening. The
statistical description of variables are displayed in Table 2.
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Variables Mean Standard error Minimum Maximum
MR 0.2335 0.06344 0.162 0.357
TSU 788901 35246 89034 1087653
LGR 0.5641 0.4973 0 1
PO 0.6778 0.4213 0 1
Table 2. descriptive statistics of the variables
5. Data Analysis and Results
Porter (1983) has given U1t a relatively strict assumption. Two-stage-oriented least square
method and the maximal likelihood method are employed respectively in regression. Green
and Porter (1984) has proved that the estimated results of two-stage-oriented least square
method are the same as those of three-stage-oriented least square method. The maximal
likelihood method is based on Keifer’s discussion (1980) on Logistic regression method.
Following it, we carried out regression analysis and discussed the results. However, it is
necessary to points out that the application of FIML (Full Information Maximum Likelihood) by
Melo, Graham and Noland (2009) and Miranda (2003) will have a better explanation for
simultaneous equations. Miranda’s application of FIML also includes Keifer’s iterative process.
The difference is that Miranda has taken the endogenous influence of dummy variable L into
account. Therefore, after the regression by Porter’s empirical method, we employed FIML
method to verify the reliability of the conclusion and robustness of the model.
Two-stage-oriented least square method (PO) Maximal likelihood method (PN)
Variables Demand function Supply function Demand function Supply function
MR -4.372***(0.173)
-3.245***
(0.144)
LGR -0.571**(0.135)
0.447**
(0.127)
TSU 0.433**(0.131)
0.167**
(0.061)
PO/PN 0.377***(0.053)
0.669***
(0.037)
DM1 0.267**(0.071)
0.522***
(0.034)
DM2 0.384***(0.043)
0.613***
(0.052)
Goodness of Fit
Adjusted Goodness of Fit
0.429
0.512
0.491
0.535
0.319
0.387
0.772
0.793
Notes: Certified by Stata11.0 measurement regression. The results of regression equation show that there are standard deviation of
regression in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
Table 3. Collusion estimation results
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As mentioned above, two-stage least square method is adopted to regression Equation (9).
2SLS of a single equation, 3SLS of simultaneous equations and iterative 3SLS can be deemed
as approximately consistent when the presumption is strict. And the measurement results are
showed on the left side of Table 3. On the right side of the table it lists the regression results
by the iterative maximum likelihood estimation method utilized by Keifer (1980). We also
considered the estimation method by GMM and found that MLE and GMM are the same when
their expectation matrix is 0.
Regression coefficients are listed in the left column when two-stage least square is applied to
Equation (9), which enables PO to offer a precise classification of structural environment and
proves that there exists price competition in power generation group. Important variables are
all different from zero obviously. It is a pity that the PO model matches poorly, while PN model
fits well. Combining the data from Table 3 and 4, comprehensive analyses are as follows: 
Price
LGR
PN 0
1
0
0.1476
0.2227
1
0.1624
0.2331
Quantity
LGR
PN 0
1
0
733556
458872
1
543755
212769
Revenue
LGR
PN 0
1
0
37756
43768
1
13466
16345
Notes: The unit of revenue is 10,000 Yuan RMB and it’s the average value settled every day.
Table 4. Collusion estimation: Details on price, quantity and revenue
(1) In the process of estimating the demand function, the two methods both show that users’
demands will be reflected on the demand function under the case that the overall power rate
has changed. According to the data, the power rate improves distinctly and users’ demands
decrease. Setting the parameters on the basis of the model, the absolute value of price
elasticity will be less than 1. Therefore, the marginal revenue of the power plants which
participate in the bidding for electric network will be negative and their benefits are likely to go
down. Meanwhile, in the pilot of price bidding for power grid, the rise in grid purchase price will
decrease the spreads space of Grid Company, which plays the role of middlemen, and will
surely harm its power-selling behavior.
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(2) The data of the supply function manifest that the sensitivity of a model can be raised by
Keifer’s method (1980) and the network price would be raised to a certain extent when grid
company changes the transmission-distribution prices. At this time, the price would be higher
if the power plants collude with each other. This can be explained by the hypothesis that there
exists inertia in a Cartel (Porter, 1983): given that the power plants have formed a recessive
Cartel through market information without the influence of the bidding policy for electric
network, the expected power price is no doubt a low price beyond the bottom line. By this
time, other participants would adopt the strategy of raising the on-grid price in the market to
guarantee the continuity of Cartel.
(3) From the PN coefficient, 0.669 which is higher than 0.5, in Table 3 and 4, there is no
reason to doubt the existence of recessive collusion. Combined with the relationship between
price and output pointed by Porter (1983) that the expected supply price is the increasing
function of power output. It can be seen as the evidence of diseconomies of scale if the
supposed cost function is used. There will be no positive effects and the duration time of Cartel
may be stimulated if the transmission-distribution price is raised in pilot enterprises in which
price bidding policy is carried out.
(4) According to the definition for parameter b3 in the model deduction, measurement
estimates show that in the sample period, it is concluded by PO that there exists price
competition strategies among the five power generation groups while that is not influenced by
the policy of price biding. However, Keifer’s calculation (1980) points out that the PN coefficient
of the top5 power generation groups are all higher than 0.5. The collusion is more serious in
the period when implementing price bidding policy. It can be known from the power price and
fluctuation of revenue in Table 4 that the number 16345 reflects the game between power
companies and power grid. Collusion may cause a 27.4% increase of network price, according
to the statistics, and decrease 23.2% of electricity quantity. While the revenue of power
generation groups increase about 13.7%. These are the benefits of these groups rather than
that of the pilot power plants that participate in the bidding. Taking relevant data from Tongliao
Power Plant affiliated from Power Investment Company in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
it can be seen that the plant’s revenue decreased by 7.8% compared with those in last period
during the work on pilot program. It is because the network price ceiling is set lower than
Cartel price. And the decrease of productivity caused by collusion leads to the declining of
revenue. According to the analysis of the power price formula, the elevation of on-grid price
squeezes and reduces the profit margins of the grid company. It has seriously affected the
enthusiasm of their participating in transmission-distribution services which lead to inactive
reaction to the policies. The result reveals that collusion among power plants will have a
negative effect on the implementation of the policy. These passive effect will act on all
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participants of pilot work directly. Therefore, the market’s equalization fund deficit should also
be settled when carrying out price bidding policy. That is to say, the balance between supply
and demand should be ensured and bearing market risk is the basis of the policy’s continuous
operation. According to the case, during the pilot process in Northeastern power market, the
whole-year bidding electricity quantity was 100 billion KWH in 2005. Such high volume means
that 1 billion margin will be produced as soon as 1 cent in power price fluctuates. The market
risks brought by large sums of money are not able to be undertaken by any market
participant. Implementing price bidding policy and carrying out the grading mechanism of
capacity price should be done at the same time. This is to guarantee fairness and justice in the
process of bidding. As for this case, under the bidding mode many power plants are still those
built with funds which repay capital with interest and they bid unequally with those funded by
the nation. Segmenting and adding up the comprehensive strength of the power plants
participating in the bidding are the foundation of dividing the bidding levels.
(5) Regional market power will lead to vicious competition. The sampled data shows that from
May 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2005, six new added subordinate plants of China Guodian
Corporation made the PN coefficient value higher than 0.5. From the materials and considering
that all the six plants are located in Dalian jurisdiction, there is a clear escalating trend of
power price in this region during the period and other power plants raised their price
responsively. Thus it can be concluded that if there is a Cartel, other single power plant or
small Cartel would in turn adopt the adhesion bidding strategies. In addition, the zoom of
power price will also strangle some small private power plants, and cause more vicious
competition in the market.
(6) Different from Porter’s method (1983), FIML is a continuous process of estimation which is
similar to three-stage least squares. Their hypothesis for the indicator variable are different.
Porter supposes that indicator variant I conforms to the Bernoulli distribution while FIML
calculation demands the indicator variant to be submitted to Poisson distribution. FIML
calculation will be taken as the inspection method to examine whether our empirical results are
stable and correct. And accordingly, it is shown that all indexes are significant: DM1 is 0.813
under the significant level of 1%; DM2 is 1.030 under that of 10%; and PO is 0.721 under that
of 1%. The estimation of PO is proved to be robust through significance examination. On the
basis of our model deduction results,  is the unbiased estimation of  supposing that
L1 is the maximum in maximum likelihood estimation by Keifer’s method (1980). What’s more,
when  = 0, L0 is the maximum in the estimation, the difference between two maxima can be
displayed as .
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(7) Based on the original hypothesis, the intrinsic model is not specifically limited. Computing
2T(L1 – L0) with the assistance of the sample data, it can be found that the original assumption
is significantly different from the result. And also we can learn that the section in which prices
are fluctuating between PO and PN may due to the non-cooperative competition which is
clearly existed. Table 4 shows us that non-cooperative competition will reduce the on-grid
price, which would play an active part in the whole industry. Till now, it can be concluded that
there are non-cooperative competition and collusion when price bidding is carried out in the
whole market.
6. Conclusions
6.1. The Control and Optimization of Power Market
Through analyzing the practical situation of the price bidding project in the northeast regional
pilot, it is inferred that collusion among exists among power enterprises in the market. And the
policy did aggravate the collusion. Moreover, non-cooperative competition and collusion are
conducted alternatively in the power market. If there is no Cartel and the market is relatively
stable, the competition among various enterprises will form lower power price. This will benefit
the development of the whole industry. When forming Cartel, high network price will be set
and then be conflict with the interests of Grid Company. The conflicts are mainly reflected on
the fluctuation space of power price. Power plants squeeze the profit margin by raising network
price, then the grid company as a middleman will further enhance the obtained profits of
transmission-distribution price. It will leave the accompanying negative influence to consumers
and be harmful to the development of the industry. The collusion action in the power-
generating process not only affects power price but also reduces market entrants with the
continuous impact of market forces formed by long-term Cartel. The concentration of market
resources in Cartel will lead to inefficient competition in power market and bring negative
impact to consumers. 
Moreover, as for the negative influence caused by collusion among power manufacturers, the
circumvention aims to maintain virtuous competition in market, avoid postponing the
implementation of market-oriented policies, and ease the contradiction among enterprises in
the power-generating and distributing sections. Finally the target is to control and reduce
power price. For example, more firms can be introduced into the power market to break the
structure which is monopolized by oligarchs. Green and Porter (1984) have shown that more
market participants will efficiently decrease the negative influence brought by the collusion.
But this method cannot get rid of collusion thoroughly since it can be seen everywhere. More
market participants would efficiently weaken the strength of collusion groups and undermine
the effects on market price. In addition, more participants would carve up the market shares
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owned by the original large enterprises and also the market composition would be more
harmonious.
It’s noteworthy that flagrant collusion does not appear in the power-generating process like the
JEC case. It is committed through market information or information issued by relevant
institutions (the balance among relevant personages in enterprises are also taken into
account). As the duration time of Cartel is influenced by information transmission, the
government can control the information about price fluctuation in market to make open and
transparent of market information while liberalizing market access. Also it can build a real-time
bidding system. A strong Cartel is able to handle market price and this kind of ability is often
selfish (Cournot, Bacon & Fisher, 1960). Thus, the government should keep an eye on the
abnormal price fluctuation and avoid the continuity of collusion before it appears.
This research analyzes the problems in pursuing the market-oriented policy of price bidding
and discusses the negative influence brought by collusion in China’s power supply market. It is
necessary to proactively implement the policy in light of successful cases in advanced
countries. Based on our empirical study, relevant units should control network price and the
power output by using the concept of balanced index. That means they shall observe the
fluctuation in the ratio of each power plant’s on-grid price and electricity quantity under
relatively stable conditions of competition. What’s more, the control of output ought to be
accompanied by the awareness of reduction caused by non-market demand fluctuation. Grid
companies’ profits from the excess transmission-distribution price must be avoided. And the
transmission-distribution price should be limited to avoid the conflicts among enterprises in the
generation-distribution process and create good conditions for carrying out the policy. With
regard to the monopoly market structure formed by the five power generation groups, we
consider that it can be divided to increase the number of group companies which will avoid the
growth of its forces.
6.2. Strategic Management of Collusion Among Enterprises
It is found that the participants in the market are enterprises with different functions when
observing the empirical case carefully. And because of the appearance of collusion, there are
both beneficiaries and the harmed among other relevant enterprises. For instance, the grid
company is influenced by collusion although it did not take part in the regular market
activities. The influence of collusion on the benefited and harmed enterprises can be
summarized as follows: 
Empirical research reveals that collusion can bring benefits to power groups themselves. As a
way of enterprise collaboration, collusion can produce synergy for the participating enterprises,
however, at the cost of hurting other market entities. It brings little active influence on the
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whole power market and is much likely to harm other market entities. If taking collusion
cooperation as the basis, more enterprises need to be networked to expand the synergistic
effect and to promote the revenue of the whole power market. Meanwhile, the market
information should be public inside the group so as to ensure that the information resources
can be shared and the price signals be captured in the power plant subordinated by the group.
And enterprises could achieve synergistic effect to promote their revenue because collusion
may be restricted by relevant laws and market conditions.
This research shows that collusion harmed the benefits of other market entities outside the
cartel. Further, when enterprises collaborating with one another for extra profits, the others’
benefits may be damaged and they may be forced to adjust prices or output or form new
alliances to keep profitable. As the competition is no longer one-to-one for most enterprises, it
has become a challenge to keep efficient cooperation and virtuous competition. It is going to
be further studied. Directors, especially those market supervisors must look on the value
activities from a systematic perspective, advocate efficient cooperation and regulate behaviors
which apparently harm market efficiency.
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